Abstract-For a pair of (dependent) random variables (X, Y ), the following problem is addressed: What is the maximum information that can be revealed about Y , while disclosing no information about X? Assuming that a Markov kernel maps Y to the revealed information U , it is shown that the maximum mutual information between Y and U , i.e., I(Y ; U ), can be obtained as the solution of a standard linear program, when X and U are required to be independent, called perfect privacy. The resulting quantity is shown to be greater than or equal to the non-private information about X carried by Y . For jointly Gaussian (X, Y ), it is shown that perfect privacy is not possible if the kernel is applied to only Y ; whereas perfect privacy can be achieved if the mapping is from both X and Y ; that is, if the private variables can also be observed at the encoder. Finally, it is shown that when Y is not a deterministic function of X, perfect privacy is always feasible when the mapping has access to both X and Y . 
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a situation in which Alice wants to release some useful information to Bob, represented by random variable Y , and she receives some utility from this disclosure of information. At the same time, she wishes to conceal from Bob some private information which depends on Y , represented by X. To this end, a privacy-preserving mapping is applied, whereby a distorted version of Y , denoted by U , is revealed to Bob. In this context, privacy and utility are competing goals: The more distorted version of Y is revealed by the privacy mapping, the less information can Bob infer about X, while the less utility can be obtained. An extreme point of this tradeoff is the scenario termed as perfect privacy, which refers to the situation where nothing is allowed to be inferred about X by Bob through the disclosure of U . This condition is modelled by the statistical independence of X and U .
In [1] , a general statistical inference framework is proposed to capture the loss of privacy in legitimate transactions of data. In [2] , the privacy-utility trade-off under the self-information cost function (log-loss) is considered and called the privacy funnel. In [3] , sharp bounds on the optimal privacy-utility trade-off for the privacy funnel are derived, and an alternative characterization of the perfect privacy condition (see [4] ) is proposed. Measuring both the privacy and the utility in terms of mutual information, perfect privacy is fully characterized in [5] for the binary case.
We study the information-theoretic perfect privacy in this paper, and our main contributions are as follows:
• Adopting mutual information as the utility measure, i.e., I(Y ; U ), we show that the maximum utility under perfect privacy is the solution to a standard linear program (LP) that can be efficiently solved 2 .
• We show that when (X, Y ) is a jointly Gaussian pair with non-zero correlation coefficient, for the privacy mapping p U |Y , perfect privacy is not feasible. In other words, maximum privacy is obtained at the expense of zero utility. This, however, is not the case when the mapping is of the form p U |X,Y ; that is, when the encoder has access to the private latent variables as well as the data.
• Denoting the maximum I(Y ; U ) under perfect privacy by g 0 (X, Y ), we characterize the relationship between the non-private information about X carried by Y , D X (Y ) as defined in [5] , and g 0 (X, Y ). Notations. Random variables are denoted by capital letters, their realizations by lower case letters, and their alphabets by capital letters in calligraphic font. Matrices and vectors are denoted by bold capital and bold lower case letters, respectively. For integers m ≤ n, we have the discrete interval [m : n] {m, m + 1, . . . , n}, and the tuple (a m , a m+1 , . . . , a n ) is written in short as a [m:n] . For an integer n ≥ 1, 1 n denotes an n-dimensional all-one column vector. For a random variable X ∈ X , with finite |X |, the probability simplex P(X ) is the standard (|X | − 1)-simplex given by
Furthermore, to each probability mass function (pmf) on X, denoted by p X (·), corresponds a probability vector p X ∈ P(X ), whose i-th element is p X (x i ) (i ∈ [1 : |X |]). Likewise, for a pair of random variables (X, Y ) with joint pmf p X,Y , the probability vector p X|y corresponds to the conditional pmf p X|Y (·|y), ∀y ∈ Y, and P X|Y is an |X | × |Y| matrix with columns p X|y , ∀y ∈ Y. F Y (·) denotes the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of random variable Y , and if it admits a density, its probability density function (pdf) is denoted by f Y (·). For 0 ≤ t ≤ 1, H b (t) −t log 2 t − (1 − t) log 2 (1 − t) denotes the binary entropy function with the convention 0 log 0 = 0. Throughout the paper, for a random variable Y with the corresponding probability vector p Y , the entropies H(Y ) and H(p Y ) are written interchangeably.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
Consider a pair of random variables (X, Y ) ∈ X × Y (|X |, |Y| < ∞) distributed according to the joint distribution p X,Y . We assume that p Y (y) > 0, ∀y ∈ Y and p X (x) > 0, ∀x ∈ X , since otherwise the supports Y or/and X could have been modified accordingly. Let X denote the private/sensitive data that the user wants to conceal and Y denote the useful data the user wishes to disclose. Assume that the privacy mapping takes Y as input and maps it to the released data denoted by U . In this scenario, X − Y − U form a Markov chain, and the privacy mapping is captured by the conditional distribution p U |Y .
Let g (X, Y ) be defined as [5] g (X, Y ) sup
In other words, when mutual information is adopted as a measure of both utility and privacy, (1) gives the optimal utility-privacy trade-off. Proposition 1. In the evaluation of g 0 (X, Y ), it is sufficient to restrict our attention to |U| ≤ |Y|.
Proof. The proof is provided in [6, Appendix B].
III. PERFECT PRIVACY Definition. For a pair of random variables (X, Y ), we say that perfect privacy is feasible if there exists a random variable U , such that X − Y − U form a Markov chain, X ⊥ ⊥ U , i.e., X and U are independent, and Y ⊥ ⊥ U .
From the above definition, we can say that perfect privacy being feasible is equivalent to having g 0 (X, Y ) > 0.
Proposition 2. Perfect privacy is feasible if and only if dim Null(P X|Y ) = 0.
Proof. In [4, Theorem 4] , the authors showed that for a given pair of random variables (X, Y ) ∈ X × Y (|X |, |Y| < ∞), there exists a random variable U satisfying the conditions of perfect privacy if and only if the columns of P X|Y are linearly dependent. Equivalently, there must exist a non-zero vector v, such that P X|Y v = 0, which is equivalent to (2).
Proposition 3. For the null space of P X|Y , we have
Proof. For any z in the null space of P X|Y ,
The last claim of the proposition is due to the fact that p Y is in the interior of P(Y), i.e., p Y (y) > 0, ∀y ∈ Y.
Theorem 1. For a pair of random variables (X, Y ) ∈ X ×Y (|X |, |Y| < ∞), g 0 (X, Y ) is the solution to a standard linear program (LP) given in (10).
Proof. From the singular value decomposition of P X|Y , we have P X|Y = UΣV T , where the right-singular vectors are denoted by v i , i ∈ [1 : |Y|]. The condition in (2) is equivalent to having the null space of P X|Y written as 3 Null(P X|Y ) = Span{v m , v m+1 , . . . , v |Y| }, for some m ≤ |Y|.
(4) For any pair (Y, U ), for which X−Y −U form a Markov chain, the independence of X and U , i.e., p X = p X|u , ∀u ∈ U, is equivalent to the following for any u ∈ U:
For the index m given in (4), construct the matrix A as
From (4) and (5), we can write
Therefore, for any pair (Y, U ), if X − Y − U form a Markov chain and X ⊥ ⊥ U , we must have p Y |u ∈ S, ∀u ∈ U, where S is a convex polytope defined as
It can be verified that any element of S is a probability vector. 4 On the other hand, for any pair (Y, U ), for which p Y |u ∈ S, ∀u ∈ U, we can simply make X − Y − U , where X ⊥ ⊥ U . Therefore, we can write
This leads us to write g 0 (X, Y ) as
where in (8) , since the minimization is over p U (·) and p Y |u rather than p U |Y , a constraint was added to preserve the marginal distribution p Y . Proposition 4. In minimizing H(Y |U ) over p Y |u ∈ S, it is sufficient to consider only |Y| extreme points of S.
Proof. Assume that the minimum in (8) is achieved by N (≤ |Y|) points in S, which follows from Proposition 1. Let p be an arbitrary point among these N points. p can be written
|Y|]) belong to the extreme 3 We assume, without loss of generality, that the singular values are arranged in a descending order. 4 We have ∀x ∈ S, (x − p Y ) ∈ Null(P X|Y ), and from Proposition 3, 1 T |Y| · x = 1. 5 The set S is an at most (|Y| − 1)-dimensional convex subset of R |Y| . Therefore, any point in S can be written as a convex combination of at most |Y| extreme points of S.
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where the equality holds if and only if all of the α i s but one are zero. From the definition of an extreme point, if p is not an extreme point of S, it can be written with at least two nonzero α i s, which makes the inequality in (9) strict. However, this violates the assumption that the N points achieve the minimum. Hence, all of the N points of the minimizer must belong to the set of extreme points of S.
Therefore, the problem in (8) has two phases: in phase one, the extreme points of set S are identified, while in phase two, proper weights over these extreme points are obtained to minimize the objective function, i.e., H(Y |U ).
For the first phase, we proceed as follows. The extreme points of S are the basic feasible solutions (see [7] , [8] ) of it, i.e., the basic feasible solutions of the set For the second phase, we proceed as follows. Assume that the extreme points of S, found in the previous phase, are denoted by p 1 , p 2 , . . . , p K . Then (8) is equivalent to
where w is a K-dimensional weight vector, and it can be verified that the constraint 
where the minimum value is 0.8437 bits, which is achieved by w * = 0.698 0.1538 0.1481 0 T . There-
3]. Finally, p * U |Y can be derived from the above. Thus far, we have investigated the constraint of perfect privacy when |X |, |Y| < ∞. The following theorem shows that perfect privacy is not feasible for the (correlated) jointly Gaussian pair.
Theorem 2. Let (X, Y ) ∼ N (µ, Σ) be a pair of jointly Gaussian random variables, where
in which ρ = 0, since otherwise X ⊥ ⊥ Y . We have g 0 (X, Y ) = 0 for the above pair.
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Proof. If there exists a random variable U such that X −Y −U form a Markov chain and X ⊥ ⊥ U , we must have F X (·) = F X|U (·|u), ∀u ∈ U, and hence, f X (·) = f X|U (·|u), ∀u ∈ U, since X admits a density. Equivalently, we must have
Also, to have g 0 (X, Y ) > 0, there must exists at least u 1 , u 2 ∈ U, such that
In what follows we show that if (12) holds, (13) cannot be satisfied; and therefore, perfect privacy is not feasible for a jointly Gaussian (X, Y ) pair. It is known that X conditioned on {Y = y} is also Gaussian, given by
From (12), (14), and for u 1 , u 2 ∈ U, we have
(15) Multiplying both sides of (15) by e jωx , and taking the integral with respect to x, we obtain
By Fubini's theorem 6 , we can write
After some manipulations, we get
Since ρ = 0, from (14), we have α = 0. Hence, the LHS of (16) is a Fourier transform. Due to the invertiblity of the Fourier transform, i.e. e jωt dg(t) = 0 ⇐⇒ dg(t) = 0, we must have F Y |U (·|u 1 ) = F Y |U (·|u 2 ). Therefore, (13) does not hold and perfect privacy is not feasible for the (correlated) jointly Gaussian pair (X, Y ).
For a pair of random variables (X, Y ) ∈ X × Y (|X |, |Y| < ∞), the private information about X carried by Y is defined in [5] as C X (Y ) min
Since H(W |Y ) = 0 implies that W is a deterministic function of Y , (17) means that among all the functions of Y that make X and Y conditionally independent, we want to find the one with the lowest entropy. The non-private information about X carried by Y is defined in [5] as
Let T X : Y → P(X ) be a mapping from Y to the probability simplex on X defined by y → p X|Y (·|y). It was shown in [5, Theorem 3] If P X|Y has at least two identical columns, we defineP X|Y as follows 7 . Let E m ⊂ [1 : |Y|], ∀m ∈ [1 : B], for some B ≥ 1, be a set of indices corresponding to the columns in P X|Y that are equal, i.e., p X|yi = p X|yj , ∀i, j ∈ E m , ∀m ∈ 
where the equality holds if and only if either of the following holds: 1) Perfect privacy is not feasible, i.e. dim(Null(P X|Y )) = 0, 2) Perfect privacy is feasible, and dim(Null(P X|Y )) = 0.
V. FULL DATA OBSERVATION VS. OUTPUT PERTURBATION
Thus far, we have assumed that the privacy mapping takes Y as input and maps it to the released data denoted by U . In a more general scenario, the privacy mapping can take a noisy version W of (X, Y ) as input, as in [9] . In this case, the privacy mapping is denoted by p U |W , and (X, Y ) − W − U form a Markov chain, where the triplet (X, Y, W ) ∈ X × Y × W (|X |, |Y|, |W| < ∞) is distributed according to some given joint distribution p X,Y,W . In this model, perfect privacy
